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BOOK REVIEW
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM. By
Robert E. Hudec.t Gower: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1987.
Pp. xix, 259. £12.95.
Reviewed By Christopher T. Curtis*
This is a timely book. The general economic condition of devel-
oping countries continues to be poor. Trade is an important ele-
ment in the economic welfare of these countries; the GATT' is the
principal international structure for regulating trade; and a new
round of GATT trade negotiations-the "Uruguay Round"--is un-
derway. So it is appropriate to review how well the GATT system is
working for the developing countries and whether the present legal
regime should be changed. This study, by an eminent scholar of the
GATT,2 argues that the present regime does not work well for the
developing countries that are its intended beneficiaries, and should
be replaced. 3
The GATT is not an undertaking by its members to eliminate all
trade barriers. Rather, the GATT imposes three more modest obli-
gations. First, member governments seeking to control foreign trade
should do so only by means of tariffs, and should eliminate nontariff
barriers such as quantitative restrictions.4 Second, governments
should participate in periodic negotiations to reduce existing tariff
t Melvin C. Steen Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, United
States. B.A. 1934, Kenyon College; M.A. 1958, Cambridge University; LL.B. 1961, Yale
University.
* Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; Member, District of Columbia
Bar; A.B. 1978, J.D. 1981, Harvard University.
I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature October 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2 See, e.g., R. HUDEC, THE GATT AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975); ADJUDICA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES (1977). During the Kennedy Round Trade Nego-
tiations (1963-1967), Hudec served as Assistant General Counsel for the Office of the
Special Trade Representative for Trade Negotiations, which is currently called the Office
of the United States Trade Representative.
3 R. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE GAIT LEGAL SYSTEM (1987).
4 GAIT, supra note i, art. XI.
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions.
i. No prohibitions other than duties, taxes, or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of
any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exporta-
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levels through a process of reciprocal bargaining whereby each gov-
ernment reduces trade barriers in exchange for similar action by
other governments. 5 This is the "reciprocity" principle that is cen-
tral to GATT trade negotiations. Third, a member government's
trade barriers, and reductions in those barriers, must apply equally
to all trading partners, not just to one or a few. 6 This is the "most
favored nation" (MFN) principle, also a central principle of the
GATT since its creation in 1947.
As Professor Hudec explains, there is a fundamental contradic-
tion between modern economic theory and the economic assump-
tions of the GATT. The reciprocity principle that is at the heart of
the GATT assumes that, from an individual country's perspective,
exports are good and imports are bad. Under this "mercantilist"
theory of trade, a country that lowers its trade barriers is taking ac-
tion harmful to itself, and it does so in GATT negotiations only to
obtain a benefit from other countries: reductions in their trade barri-
ers. It is true that greater exports stimulate greater activity and em-
ployment in the export sector of a country's economy, while greater
imports harm import-competing industries and reduce employment.
But mercantilist theory ignores the fact that inexpensive imports
benefit a country's consumers. While inexpensive imports reduce
employment in import-competing industries, they thereby free a
country's economic resources for more productive activity. The uni-
versally accepted modern economic theory of international trade is
the theory of "comparative advantage," which argues that global
economic welfare will be maximized if each country applies its re-
sources to those products in the production of which it is relatively
more efficient than other countries. A country should export those
products in which it has a comparative advantage and import others
it which it does not have such an advantage. Under modern eco-
nomic theory, a country will benefit even if it lowers trade barriers
unilaterally. 7
Why then is the GATT based on reciprocity? Why does the
tion or sale for exportation of any product destined for the territory of any
other contracting party.
Id.
5 See id., art. II (Schedules of Concession), and art. XXVIII (Modification of
Schedules).
6 Id. art. I.
General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment.
I. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation ... any advantage, favour, privi-
lege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and un-
conditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories
of all other contracting parties.
Id.
7 For an introductory discussion of comparative-advantage theory in world trade,
see F. RooT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INVESTMENT 55-87 (3d ed. 1973).
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GATT practice "voodoo economics"? 8 It is because reciprocity is
necessary to overcome internal political barriers to trade liberaliza-
tion. The benefits of free trade are spread thinly across all of a coun-
try's consumers, but the disadvantages are focused sharply on
import-competing industries, which as a result are likely to be vocal
and politically active. (That effect is especially visible in the United
States in this election year). Reciprocal lowering of trade barriers in
other countries has the effect of mobilizing important domestic con-
stituencies for free trade, primarily export industries. The fact that
GATT rules are obligations of international law provides additional
support for governments seeking to do what they know is right in the
face of domestic opposition. The GAIT rules are usually called the
GATT "discipline." This is appropriate. Like the discipline of a
diet, the GAIT discipline is for the patient's own good although it
may be uncomfortable.
Professor Hudec describes how, from the first, the developing
countries insisted that the GATT rules should not apply to them.
Their demand was for "special and differential treatment," a demand
based on what Professor Hudec calls the "welfare obligation," 9 the
obligation of the developed countries to assist their poorer neigh-
bors. That demand has been a compelling one since the developing
countries plainly have needed assistance. And, as Professor Hudec
puts it, since the GAIT had no money to give the developing coun-
tries, instead it gave rules. 10 That is, the developing countries were
not to be bound by the same restrictions as the developed countries.
Over the decades, despite opposition by developed country repre-
sentatives, the GATT regime applicable to developing countries has
come to be quite different from the regime that applies to developed
countries dealing among themselves. First, the developing countries
are not subject to the reciprocity requirement." The developed
countries should reduce their trade barriers, but the developing
countries are not required to reduce theirs in return. Second, the
developing countries are entitled to "preferences" in the import reg-
ulations of the developed countries. 12 That is, the developed coun-
tries should impose lesser restraints on imports from developing
countries than on imports from other developed countries-the
MFN requirement does not apply.
8 HUDEC, supra note 3, at 143-44.
9 Id. 186-87.
10 Id.
11 See GATT, supra note 1, at Part IV (entered into forceJune 27, 1966). "The devel-
oped contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-devel-
oped contracting parties." Id. art. XXXVI(8).
12 See id. art XVIII. (Governmental Assistance to Economic Development). Section 1
describes developing countries as "those contracting parties the economies of which can
only support low standards of living and are in the early stages of development." Id.
19881
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The GATT regime applicable to developing countries is com-
pletely consistent with the mercantilist trade theory that the GATT,
as a whole, at least superficially reflects. The rules are intended to
promote exports from developing countries, which are good, with-
out requiring increased imports by developing countries, which
would be bad. But the special GATT regime for developing coun-
tries is also justifiable within the framework of modern comparative-
advantage theory if that theory is modified to accommodate the so-
called "infant-industry" doctrine. That doctrine asserts that, be-
cause of market barriers and imperfections, capital will not flow to
potentially efficient new industries in developing countries unless
those industries are protected from import competition for a time
sufficient to allow them to become competitive in world markets.13
The extent to which the infant-industry phenomenon justifies import
restraint by developing countries is a point on which economists do
not agree. Disagreement about appropriate GATT rules resulting
from disagreement over the underlying economic realities is a basic
element in the present GATT scene.
Professor Hudec's thesis is that it is possible to evaluate the
soundness of the GATT's legal rules applicable to developing coun-
tries separately from the underlying economic theories. He strongly
criticizes the GATT's legal rules, but, he argues, acceptance of his
criticisms does not require adherence to one or another camp of de-
velopment economists.
Professor Hudec analyzes and criticizes both the nonreciprocity
aspect and the preferences aspect of the GATT's present approach
to developing countries. First, Professor Hudec questions whether
acceptance of the reciprocity rule would benefit developing coun-
tries. It is commonly argued that acceptance of reciprocity would
assist the developing countries in obtaining concessions from devel-
oped countries, but Professor Hudec disagrees. He argues that de-
veloping countries already import as much as their foreign-exchange
earnings allow, and that export interests in developed countries
know this. Consequently, an offer of lower trade barriers by devel-
oping countries would not mobilize domestic interests in developed
countries to a greater degree than developing country insistence on
the welfare obligation already has.14
Nevertheless, Professor Hudec urges that the acceptance by de-
veloping country governments of the "discipline" of reciprocity
would assist those governments in resisting protectionist forces in
their own countries. Even if one assumes that the infant-industry
doctrine is correct, developing country governments are besieged by
many economically unjustifiable claims for relief. If developing
13 HUDEC, supra note 3, at 144-47.
14 Id. at 193-96.
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country governments were able to plead GAIT legal obligations,
they could more easily fend off undeserving claimants and focus im-
port relief where it was needed.
Professor Hudec's judgment on preferences is likewise mixed.
He thinks it likely that developing countries' clamor for preferences
has resulted in some instances of lower trade barriers in developed
countries, stimulating developing country exports with attendant
benefits. Professor Hudec also thinks, though, that the legitimation
of preferences as an exception to the MFN obligation has stimulated
a fantastic proliferation of other discriminatory practices, the detri-
mental effects of which have outweighed the benefits attributable to
the initial preferences.
Furthermore, Professor Hudec argues that the real impediment
to developing countries' growth through trade has not been devel-
oped country trade barriers of general applicability, but rather the
springing up of new, discriminatory practices directed specially
against developing countries. For example, developing countries
tend to have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries;
hence they pose the greatest threat to such industries in developed
countries and are a likely target for protectionist restraints. But de-
veloping countries are not economically powerful trading partners
and therefore lack sufficient leverage to resist such restraints. Conse-
quently, they would benefit most from renewed application of the
GATT's MFN principle. No developed country could restrain im-
ports from developing countries without also restraining those from
other developed countries. Developing countries' interests would be
linked with those of powerful developed countries, and trade re-
straints detrimental to developing countries would be much less easy
to impose. 15
Professor Hudec's recommendations flow from his criticisms of
the existing rules. First, he thinks that developing countries should
abandon their continuing demands for preferences and instead
should work toward strengthening the GATT's MFN requirement.
He also thinks, though, that the GATT's MFN rules have so deterio-
rated over the decades that "the moment to create a strong and ef-
fective MFN policy has been allowed to slip away and . . . the next
opportunity will probably not arrive until the world's next major eco-
nomic collapse."16
Second, Professor Hudec thinks that developing countries
should accept the GATT's legal disciplines, particularly with respect
to reciprocity-not as a means of extracting trade concessions from
15 Discriminatory trade restraints are generally illegal under GATT. How developed
countries nevertheless get away with them to a degree severely damaging to developing
countries is a question the book does not completely answer. See id. at 182-85.
16 Id. at 228.
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developed countries, but rather to assist themselves in opposing do-
mestic demands for protection. Professor Hudec suggests a variety
of mechanisms by which developed countries can pressure develop-
ing countries into accepting greater discipline.17
Professor Hudec's basic argument-that the GAT legal rules
can be criticized and improved upon regardless of'which economic
theory one accepts-is a bold one. Normally one would expect the
opposite to be true: To evaluate the efficacy of legal rules directed
toward an economic objective, as the GATT rules are, one must
know what the economic realities are. So it is fair to ask whether
Professor Hudec succeeds in the approach he has taken.
It appears that his success is mixed. His criticism of preferences
as promoting the use of other discriminatory practices that outweigh
the benefits of the preferences is an argument that, though requiring
considerable feel for the empirical realities of international trade,
does not depend for its acceptance on one's being a mercantilist, a
free trader, or a protector of infant industries. The same is true of
Professor Hudec's argument that, because developing countries are
already importing all that their foreign-exchange earnings allow, ac-
ceptance of the GATT's reciprocity discipline would not significantly
increase their political ability to obtain trade concessions from devel-
oped countries. 1 8
The same cannot be said of Professor Hudec's argument that
developing countries would benefit most from reinforcement of the
GAIT's MFN obligation. It appears that there are those who disa-
gree, arguing that "developing countries would not benefit very
much from [a world economy based on MFN liberalization] because
the handicaps faced by their industries render them unable to com-
pete effectively in such a market."' 9 Professor Hudec admits that
this is a "disagreement over basic economic issues."20
The validity of Professor Hudec's argument that developing
countries would benefit from accepting more GATT reciprocity dis-
cipline as a means of controlling unjustified domestic demands for
17 E.g., by means of conventional tariff negotiations with developing countries, by
stimulating enactment of codes within the current structure of the GATT (as was done to a
limited extent in the Tokyo Round negotiations), by more vigorously enforcing procedure
for review of balance-of-payment restrictions, and by urging the Trade and Development
Committee to foster developing country acceptance of GAT discipline. Id. at 232-36.
18 There is some tension, though, between Professor Hudec's argument that the de-
veloping countries already import as much as their foreign-exchange earnings permit and
his argument that the current regime of nonreciprocity results in excessive protection of
developing countries' domestic industries. Combining these two points, Professor
Hudec's argument must be that, while developing countries import as much as they can,
they do not import the economically optimal mix of products. That is, the current regime
distorts the choice of imports rather than reducing the amount of them. But, if that is
Professor Hudec's argument, it should be developed more clearly.
19 HUDEC, supra note 3, at 152.
20 Id.
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protection also, in my opinion, depends in some degree on one's
underlying economic beliefs. First, of course, the argument is con-
trary to mercantilist thinking, which holds that suppression of im-
ports is good per se. Professor Hudec may be right that, as an
economic theory, mercantilism is bankrupt, indefensible, "voodoo
economics," not advocated by any serious economist in more than
two centuries (if ever). But Professor Hudec also admits that mer-
cantilist thinking continues to exert a powerful hold over politicians,
officials, and their publics. For example, a recent U.S. presidential
candidate saw his political fortunes rise sharply after he advocated
the imposition of massive trade barriers to preclude American con-
sumers from purchasing an inexpensive automobile manufactured in
South Korea. A better-functioning system of international trade,
within or without the GATT, therefore requires continuing educa-
tion of the world's policy makers in the economic framework within
which such trade must be analyzed-that is, the theory of compara-
tive advantage.2'
Second, and more significantly, the validity of Professor Hudec's
criticism of the nonreciprocity policy as exposing developing country
governments to too many unwarranted claims for import relief de-
pends on the extent to which one accepts the infant-industry doc-
trine. GATT discipline fortifying developing country governments
against unjustified demands for protection is desirable if one be-
lieves, with Professor Hudec, that much or most protection is harm-
ful and that governments are not good at identifying the few claims
that are meritorious. Professor Hudec's arguments in support of his
position are persuasive. But an enthusiast for the protection of in-
fant industries might conclude, to the contrary, that the risk of over-
protection if the government is not restrained by GATT discipline is
outweighed by harmful restrictions on government action that that
discipline would require. 22
The force of the recommendations for change that Professor
Hudec offers at the end of his book is likewise affected by the contin-
uing disagreement over the economic effects of international trade
on developing countries. Professor Hudec's first recommendation is
that, instead of fighting for more preferences, developing countries
should work to strengthen the GATT's MFN obligation. But if pro-
21 That theory, because it underlies much of Professor Hudec's analysis, deserves
fuller explanation in his book. It is not a self-evident theory, and is in some degree
counter-intuitive-for example, in the importance that it ascribes to comparative rather
than absolute advantage. See, e.g., ROOT, supra note 7, at 87-136 (discussing qualifications
of the basic theory of comparative advantage in international trade). For a discussion of
the economic effects of international trade on developing countries, see id. at 401-44.
22 As Professor Hudec notes, Japan imposed extensive protective measures in the
post-war period but nevertheless prospered. "Although Japan might have gained even
more from a more liberal trade policy, few governments would turn down the Japanese
growth rate as it was." HUDEC, supra note 3, at 145.
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ponents of preferences are correct that a strong MFN system would
produce few benefits for developing countries,23 then developing
countries should not "spend diplomatic capital" 24 working toward
that objective-especially if, as Professor Hudec also suggests, a
strong MFN system is already a lost cause.2 5
Professor Hudec's second recommendation is that the reciproc-
ity obligation be resurrected for developing countries. As noted
above, though, the desirability of reciprocity discipline for develop-
ing countries may depend on one's view of the limits of the infant-
industry doctrine.
The continuing disagreement over the economics of interna-
tional trade results in a degree of schizophrenia in Professor Hudec's
specific recommendations. In the main, those recommendations
comprise ways in which developed countries can pressure develop-
ing countries into greater acceptance of GATT discipline.2 6 But, as
Professor Hudec elsewhere notes,2 7 developed countries do not have
a strong self-interest in promoting the developing country legal re-
gime that he recommends. On the contrary, the tendency of devel-
oped country governments is "to lie back and simply watch as
developing countries impale themselves on ineffective policies." 28
More importantly, if it is the developing countries that are the in-
tended beneficiaries of Professor Hudec's proposals, it is they who
should take the initiative in implementing those proposals. That the
correct legal regime should be adopted as a result of developed
country pressure suggests an attitude that Professor Hudec else-
where criticizes as "coercive paternalism."'2 9 Perhaps, though, such
an incongruous situation simply results from the same political reali-
ties that gave rise to the mercantilist structure of the GATT in the
first place: To overcome domestic pressure for trade-restrictive
practices, developing country governments need to be able to rely
on pressure from developed countries.
My principal criticism of Professor Hudec's book is that it is
harder than he suggests to separate legal from economic issues. But
23 Id. at 152.
24 Id. at 228.
25 Id.
26 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
27 HUDEC, supra note 3, at 181-85.
28 Id. at 231.
29 Id. at 132. Indeed, Professor Hudec asserts that his book is "addressed primarily"
to developing country governments, although he saves that assertion for the last sentence,
and the evidence that developing country governments might be interested in his recom-
mendations is limited to a single footnote, also the last. Id. at 235. There is considerable
ambivalence in Professor Hudec's study as to the extent to which developing country gov-
ernments are likely to be receptive to his ideas. On the one hand, Professor Hudec speaks
of "the commitment of the developing countries to the current policy." Id. at 231. On the
other hand, he posits the existence of developing country governments that "want greater
legal discipline." Id. at 233.
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that is always a difficult task. That it is not fully feasible in the con-
text of international trade by developing countries means simply that
it is necessary to argue both the legal and the economic issues to the
developing countries in order to promote change. Professor Hudec's
book is a useful and very readable contribution to that campaign. 30
30 1 have two formal criticisms of the book.
1. It has no index.
2. Part I of the book, describing the history of the GATT's legal approach to devel-
oping countries and how the GATT came to its present situation, though well written, is
too long. One must wade through too much of "the painful word-by-word battle," id. at
230, before arriving exhausted at Professor Hudec's analysis.
But that analysis is worth waiting for, providing insights into many interesting issues.
For example, in two pages, id. at 186-88, Professor Hudec dispatches the argument, de-
scribed more fully elsewhere, id. at 103-08, that the present GATT system of
nonreciprocity and preferences for developing countries has matured into customary in-
ternational law-that it has become part of the new international law of development cor-
responding to the "new international economic order." Id. at 186-88.
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